

Subclasses of effective supermartingales: completeness phenomenon

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Does a given subclass of left-c.e. supermartingales define 1-randomness.

Motivation-summary

- ① Can computable objects define 1-randomness;
- ② Can 1-randomness be decomposed;
- ③ KL-random vs 1-random;

Motivation—can computable object define 1-randomness

- ▶ What is randomness?
- ▶ Randomness \Leftrightarrow “No pattern”.
- ▶ Strings with some “pattern”: 010101010101,
011000111100000111111.

Motivation—can computable object define 1-randomness

- ▶ Effective randomness \Leftrightarrow No effective pattern.
- ▶ Effective pattern: a sequence $(V_n \subseteq 2^{<\omega} : n \in \omega)$ of uniformly c.e. sets (with $[V_n] \supseteq [V_{n+1}]$) such that $m(V_n) \leq 2^{-n}$ (known as *Martin-Löf test*).

Motivation—can computable object define 1-randomness

Definition 1

A real $X \in 2^\omega$ is *Martin-Löf random* (also called *1-random*) if no Martin-Löf test $(V_n : n \in \omega)$ succeed on X . i.e., $X \notin \bigcap_n [V_n]$.

- ▶ Many definitions of effective randomness turn out to be equivalent (to 1-randomness).
- ▶ For example, X is 1-random iff there is no left-c.e. supermartingale M succeeding on X (i.e., $\limsup_n M(X \upharpoonright n) < \infty$).
- ▶ Here a *left-c.e. supermartingale* is a non decreasing computable array $(M[t] : t \in \omega)$ of supermartingales such that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} M[t](\sigma) = M(\sigma)$ exists for all $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$.

Motivation—can computable object define 1-randomness

- ▶ Unfortunately all definitions of 1-randomness concern c.e.ness, which is dissatisfactory since it is supposed to be an effective randomness notion. Numerous definitions that try not to use c.e.ness are given such as:
 - 1 Schnorr randomness: the reals on which no Schnorr test succeed (a Schnorr test is a Martin-Löf test with $m(V_n)$ being computable);
 - 2 Kurtz randomness: the reals that cannot be contained in any measure 0 effectively closed subset of 2^ω ;
 - 3 computable randomness: the reals on which no computable martingale succeed.
- ▶ But none of them are as strong as 1-randomness (1-randomness implies them but not vice versa).

Motivation—can computable object define 1-randomness

Is there a complexity notion weaker than left-c.e.ness yet makes the supermartingales (of that complexity) define 1-randomness.

Question 2

Or is there a class of left-c.e. supermartingales whose behaviour is somewhat “predictable” defining 1-randomness.

Motivation—can 1-randomness be decomposed

- ▶ If a left-c.e. supermartingale $M : 2^{<\omega} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{\geq 0}$ succeeds on X , is it because of its betting strategy of outcome or its strategy of money allocation;
- ▶ Here we say M is i -sided at $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$ iff $M(\sigma i) \geq M(\sigma \hat{\ } (1 - i))$.

Question 3 (Kasterman?)

Can we decompose M into M_0, M_1 (meaning $M_0 + M_1$ succeeds on all reals on which M succeeds) such that M_i is i -sided.

Motivation—KL-randomness vs 1-randomness

Will explain [later](#).

Question 4

Can “natural” subclass of left-c.e. supermartingale define 1-randomness?

- 1 Subclass of left-c.e. supermartingales
- 2 Main result
- 3 An outline of the proof
- 4 Further discussion

kastergale

- ▶ For a computable martingale M , we could know (computably) whether $M(\sigma 1) \geq M(\sigma 0)$.
- ▶ For a function $p : \subseteq 2^{<\omega} \rightarrow 2$, we say M is p -sided if for every $\sigma \in \text{dom}(p)$, M is $p(\sigma)$ -sided at σ , and for every $\sigma \notin \text{dom}(p)$, M is both 0-sided, 1-sided at σ .

kastergale

Definition 5 (kastergale)

For left-c.e. supermartingale M , we say M is *partially-computably-sided* (known as *kastergale*) iff:

for some partial computable function p , $M[t]$ is $p[t]$ -sided.

i.e., For each $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$, M has only one chance to decide its sidedness at σ and before it makes that decision, it has to be both 0, 1-sided at σ .

muchgale

Definition 6 (muchgale)

A supermartingale M is (l, i) -betting if for every σ such that $|\sigma| \equiv i \pmod{l}$, we have $M(\sigma) \geq \max\{M(\sigma 0), M(\sigma 1)\}$. i.e., M does not bet at certain steps. A *muchgale* is a left-c.e. supermartingale that is (l, i) -betting for some l, i .

Questions and known results

- ▶ Kasterman wondered if kastergales define 1-randomness (i.e., whether for every non-1-random real X there is a kastergale succeeding on X) [Downey, 2012];
- ▶ Hitchcock asked the same question with respect to a subclass of kastergale where the biased proportion $M(\sigma i)/M(\sigma)$ is Σ_1^0 function;
- ▶ Barmpalias, Fang and Lewis-Pye [Barmpalias et al., 2020] considered single-sided (p -sided with $p \equiv i$ for some $i \in 2$) left-c.e. supermartingales whose bias is non decreasing and showed that they do not define 1-randomness.
- ▶ Muchnick [Muchnik, 2009] considered $(2, i)$ -betting left-c.e. supermartingales and showed that they do not define 1-randomness.

Conclusion

Theorem 7 ([Barmpalias and Liu, 2021])

*The union of kastergales and muchgales does not define 1-randomness. i.e., there is a non-1-random real X on which no kastergale or **muchgale** succeed.*

Conclusion

Our analysis shows that

If a reasonable subclass of left-c.e. supermartingales defines 1-randomness, it almost means a **single member** of that class can do so. (2.1)

Formalize (2.1)

- ▶ A class of *supermartingale-approximations* is a set \mathcal{M} of supermartingale sequences $M[\leq t] = (M[0], \dots, M[t])$.
- ▶ \mathcal{M} is *non decreasing* iff: $M[t]$ dominates $M[t - 1]$;
- ▶ \mathcal{M} is *scale-closed* iff: iff for every $M[\leq t] \in \mathcal{M}$, every $c > 0$, $cM[\leq t] \in \mathcal{M}$.
- ▶ We say \mathcal{M} is *subsequence-closed* iff for every $M[\leq t] \in \mathcal{M}$, every $t_0 < \dots < t_{s-1} \leq t$, $(M[t_0], \dots, M[t_{s-1}]) \in \mathcal{M}$.

Formalize (2.1)

- ▶ We say \mathcal{M} is *homogeneous* iff, roughly speaking, looking at \mathcal{M} on a cone $[\rho]^\preceq$ is the same as that on $[\emptyset]^\preceq$.
- ▶ Homogeneous, subsequence-closed, scale-closed, Π_1^0 class:
 kastergales;
 given l , $\{(l, i)\text{-betting supermartingales} : i < l\}$;
 muchgale.
- ▶ In (2.1), by reasonable, we mean scale-closed, subsequence-closed, homogeneous and Π_1^0 .

- ▶ An \mathcal{M} -gale is: a ω -sequence $M[< \omega]$ such that $M[\leq t] \in \mathcal{M}$ for all $t \in \omega$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} M[t](\sigma)$ exists for all $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$.

A game

Whether computable \mathcal{M} -gales define 1-randomness \leftrightarrow

Whether Alice (controlling the Martin-Löf test) wins against Baby (controlling members of \mathcal{M}) in the following game.

A game

The finite version of this game:

Definition 8 ((c, n, k) - \mathcal{M} -game)

At each round $t \in \omega$:

Alice: enumerates $\sigma \in 2^n$;

Baby: presents $M_j[t]$ (for each $j < k$) such that:

- ▶ $\sum_j M_j[t](\hat{\sigma}) \geq 1$ for some $\hat{\sigma} \preceq \sigma$ (for all $\sigma \in A[t]$);
- ▶ $M_j[\leq t] \in \mathcal{M}$ for all $j < k$.

Alice wins if: $\sum_j M_j[t](\emptyset) \geq c$.

Let A denote the set of σ Alice enumerates when she wins.

A game

- ▶ Roughly speaking, if Alice has a winning strategy for (c, n, k) - \mathcal{M} -game with an arbitrary small cost $m(A)$, then \mathcal{M} does not define 1-randomness.
- ▶ Let $\mathcal{M} = \cup_I \mathcal{M}_I$ where $\mathcal{M}_I \subseteq \mathcal{M}_{I+1}$ is Π_1^0 (uniformly in I), non decreasing, scale-closed, subsequence-closed and homogeneous.

Claim 9

If for every $l, k \in \omega, \varepsilon > 0, c < 1$, Alice has a winning strategy for (c, n, k) - \mathcal{M}_l -game (for some n) such that $m(A) \leq \varepsilon$, then computable \mathcal{M} -gales do not define 1-randomness.

The constant game

Let $a, \Delta, \delta > 0, n, k \in \omega$:

Definition 10 (constant $(a, \Delta, \delta, n, k)$ - \mathcal{M} -game)

At each round $t \in \omega$:

Alice: $\sigma \in 2^n$,

Baby: $M_j[t]$ such that:

- ▶ $\sum_j M_j[t](\sigma) \geq 1$ (for all $\sigma \in A[t]$);
- ▶ $M_j[\leq t] \in \mathcal{M}$ for all $j < k$.
- ▶ $\sum_j M_j[t](\rho) \leq 1 + \delta$ for all $\rho \in 2^{\leq n}$.

Alice wins if:

- ▶ (type-(a)) $1 - \sum_j M_j[t](\emptyset) \leq (1 - m(A[t]))/a$; or
- ▶ (type-(b)) for some $\sigma_0, \sigma_1 \in A[t]$, $\|\vec{M}[t](\sigma_0) - \vec{M}[t](\sigma_1)\|_1 \geq \Delta$

constant \mathcal{M} -game vs \mathcal{M} -game

- ▶ “ $\sum_j M_j[t](\sigma) \geq 1$ ” vs
“ $\sum_j M_j[t](\hat{\sigma}) \geq 1$ for some $\hat{\sigma} \preceq \sigma$ ”;
- ▶ $\sum_j M_j[t](\rho) \leq 1 + \delta$;
- ▶ dynamic winning criterion “ $1 - \sum_j M_j[t](\emptyset) \leq (1 - m(A[t]))/a$ ” vs
“ $\sum_j M_j[t](\emptyset) \geq c$ ”
- ▶ for some $\sigma_0, \sigma_1 \in A[t]$, $\|\vec{M}[t](\sigma_0) - \vec{M}[t](\sigma_1)\|_1 \geq \Delta$

Reduce to constant game

- ▶ Roughly speaking, if Alice could win the constant \mathcal{M} -game (for $k = 1$) with $m(A) < 1$, then she could win the \mathcal{M} -game (for all k) with an arbitrary small $m(A)$.
- ▶ Let \mathcal{M} be non decreasing and homogeneous.

Claim 11

If for every $a > 0$, there exist $\Delta, \delta > 0, n \in \omega$ such that Alice has a winning strategy for the constant $(a, \Delta, \delta, n, 1)$ - \mathcal{M} -game with $m(A) < 1$, then for every $\varepsilon > 0, c < 1, k \in \omega$ there is an n such that Alice has a winning strategy for (c, n, k) - \mathcal{M} -game such that $m(A) \leq \varepsilon$.

Reduce to constant game

Proof.

See [Barmpalias and Liu, 2021].
section 2.1-2.2 (dynamic winning criterion),
section 2.3 (restricting Baby's action),
section 4.2 (type-(b) winning criterion),
section 4.3 (reduce to $k = 1$).



Reduce to constant game

- ▶ For kastergale or (l, i) -betting supermartingale-approximation, it's easy to win the constant game (for $k = 1$), thus Theorem 7 follows.
- ▶ Winning the constant game (for $k = 1$) is the only part of the proof where we take advantage of sidedness and (l, i) -betting.

Completeness phenomenon

- ▶ Moreover, if \mathcal{M} could define 1-randomness, then (for some $a > 0$, for every $\Delta, \delta > 0$, every $n \in \omega$) Alice does not have a winning strategy for the constant $(a, \Delta, \delta, n, 1)$ - \mathcal{M} -game so that $m(A) < 1$.
- ▶ This almost means that a single member of \mathcal{M} (the one Baby used against Alice) could define 1-randomness.
- ▶ With that said, this is not a concrete proof of (2.1), but a strong evidence.

A close look at iteration argument

Let $c_i \leq 1, \varepsilon_i \geq 0, n_i \in \omega$ for each $i < 2$.

Claim 12

If (for each $i < 2$) Alice has a winning strategy for (c_i, n_i, k) - \mathcal{M} -game such that $m(A) \leq \varepsilon_i$. Then Alice has a winning strategy for $(c_0 c_1, n_0 + n_1, k)$ - \mathcal{M} -game such that $m(A) \leq \varepsilon_0 \varepsilon_1$.

Proof.

- ▶ In $(c_0 c_1, n_0 + n_1, k)$ - \mathcal{M} -game, invoke winning strategy of (c_0, n_0, k) - \mathcal{M} -game.
- ▶ But when the strategy tells you to enumerate $\rho \in 2^{n_0}$, instead of enumerating it, play the winning strategy of (c_1, n_1, k) - \mathcal{M} -game at the board $[\rho] \preceq \cap 2^{n_0+n_1}$.
- ▶ Hopefully, the sub-game will force $\sum_{j < k} M_j(\rho)[t] \geq c_1$.



More efficient winning strategy

For $\mathcal{M} = \{(2, i)\text{-betting supermartingale-approximation}\}$, Alice can win the $(c, n, k)\text{-}\mathcal{M}$ -game with a cost $m(A) \approx 1/2$ (for sufficiently large n); moreover, this is optimal:

Lemma 13 ([Barmalias and Liu, 2022])

- ▶ *There is a real X with $\dim_H(X) = 1/2$ such that there is no $(2, i)$ -betting left-c.e. supermartingale succeeding on X .*
- ▶ *For every real X with $\dim_H(X) < 1/2$, every $i \in 2$, there is a $(2, i)$ -betting left-c.e. supermartingale succeeding on X ;*

More efficient winning strategy

Alice can win the (c, n, k) - \mathcal{M} -game (with $c = 1, n = 2$) with a cost $m(A) \leq \frac{3}{4}$. Thus, let $\dim_P(X)$ denote the *packing dimension* of X , namely $\limsup_n K(X \upharpoonright n)/n$.

Theorem 14 ([Barnaliyas and Liu, 2022])

There is a real $X \in 2^\omega$ on which no $(2, i)$ -betting left-c.e. supermartingale succeeds for all $i < 2$ such that $\dim_P(X) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{2} \log_2(4/3)$.

Given a subclass \mathcal{M} of left-c.e. supermartingales and $d \geq 0$,






Question 15

Is there a real X with $\dim_H(X) \leq d$ (resp. $\dim_P(X) \leq d$) such that there is no member of \mathcal{M} succeeding on X .

Question 16

Is there a winning strategy of Alice on the (c, n, k) - \mathcal{M} -game (when n is sufficiently large) such that $m(A) \leq \exp(-O(1)n)$?

Many thanks
Is there any question?

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